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When a party refers to evidentiary material in the course of 
litigation, ordinarily this party is under an obligation to make this 
evidence available to his opponent, particularly when called 
upon to do so. However, over the years various principles have 
developed which make this obligation subject to certain 
limitations. The Fochville cases dealt with a situation where a 
party to litigation sought to withhold certain information from its 
adversary, notwithstanding the fact that the material had been 
relied upon as a ground for the institution of the litigation. This 
note critiques the judgments of the High Court and in particular 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in this dispute. In so doing, it draws 
on useful foreign law to argue that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal's judgment was an unfortunate one in that the court failed 
to clarify with reasonable precision the circumstances in which a 
party to litigation involving children's interests may legitimately 
resist disclosing evidence to his adversary, in which the party 
resisting disclosure invokes the principle of public interest 
immunity. In this regard, the note concludes that the High Court's 
overall approach to the issue is to be preferred. 
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1 Introduction 
Facing the trial of his life in 1603 Sir Walter Raleigh, objecting to the 
admission of hearsay evidence, exclaimed: 
Let my accuser come face-to-face and be deposed. Were the case but for a 
small copyhold, you would have witnesses or good proof to lead the jury to a 
verdict; and I am here for my life.1 
His cries were in vain; the hearsay evidence was admitted and formed the 
basis of his conviction. This case has gone on to become a symbol of the 
principles of open justice and fairness in judicial proceedings. Indeed, 
Raleigh's experiences played a role in the inclusion of the Confrontation 
Clause in the United States Constitution.2 It is with Sir Walter in mind that I 
think the recent case of Centre for Child Law v The Governing Body of 
Hoërskool Fochville3 raises some important questions about the principles 
of openness and fairness in legal proceedings. Amongst other issues, it 
raises the interesting question of the extent to which our law recognises 
public interest immunity in legal proceedings involving children's interests. 
This is even more so when one juxtaposes the Supreme Court of Appeal's4 
decision with that of the High Court.5 
The primary purpose of this note is to argue that the Supreme Court missed 
an opportunity to develop and provide a clear test as to how courts should 
deal with disclosure claims in litigation involving children. This is in 
circumstances where discovery is resisted on the basis that if granted it will 
be to the severe detriment of the children concerned. Flowing from this 
broader point, I will address several ancillary issues which arose in this 
case; and these are: 
a. Should any party bear an onus of proving whether the disclosure of 
the information sought to be withheld is warranted? If so, which party? 
                                            
  Michael Tsele. BA LLB (Rhodes University). Part-time Lecturer and LLM Candidate, 
Rhodes University, South Africa. Email: g10n2746@campus.ru.ac.za. 
1. Jardine Lives and Criminal Trials 427. 
2  This Constitution of the United States of America: Sixth Amendment provides that 
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him". See generally Crawford v Washington 541 US 36 
(2004). 
3  Centre for Child Law v The Governing Body of Hoërskool Fochville 2016 2 SA 121 
(SCA) (hereinafter referred to as Fochville 2). 
4  Hereinafter referred to as the Supreme Court or SCA, interchangeably. 
5  Governing Body of Hoërskool Fochville v Centre for Child Law; In Re: Governing 
Body of Hoërskool Fochville v MEC Education Gauteng 2014 6 SA 561 (GJ), 
(hereinafter referred to as Fochville 1). 
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b. In cases involving children, is it sufficient for a party seeking to prevent 
disclosure to merely assert that so doing will not be in the best interests 
of the child? 
2 Facts of the case 
I begin by canvassing the facts of the case.6 In late 2011, the School 
Governing Body of Hoërskool Fochville (SGB) launched legal proceedings 
seeking to interdict the Gauteng provincial education authorities in essence 
from forcing the school to admit certain learners, all of whom were English-
speaking black children. The SGB also sought to have any decision taken 
to force such admissions to be reviewed and set aside on the basis that the 
school did not have the capacity to accommodate the concerned children 
and that the admission of these children was against the school's admission 
policy. Admission, it was argued, would lead to intolerable and 
unmanageable over-crowding. The provincial authorities argued that the 
school did have the capacity to accommodate the additional students 
notwithstanding its claims to the contrary by the SGB. The SGB's urgent 
application failed and so the students were eventually admitted into the 
school. It is important to note that the school is traditionally or historically an 
Afrikaans medium school. 
In December 2012 the provincial authorities instituted legal proceedings 
seeking to change the school's language policy from Afrikaans medium to 
dual medium, in order to accommodate more black students, most of whom 
understood only English. The Centre for Child Law (the Centre) applied to 
intervene in the proceedings; and in support of the application an attorney7 
at the Centre produced an affidavit in which she detailed what she claimed 
was evidence of racial abuse and discrimination at the school. She stated 
that this evidence had been collected in the form of various interviews with 
a number of black children. These had been collected by means of 
questionnaires. The children had been told to detail their experiences at the 
school, and had been advised that the information would be kept 
confidential. 
The school opposed the Centre's application, but before filing an answering 
affidavit it instituted interlocutory proceedings in terms of rule 35(12) of the 
Uniform Rules of Court requiring the Centre to produce for inspection the 
questionnaires completed by the learners, in their original form. The Centre 
refused to disclose, on multiple grounds. The grounds included that the 
communication was privileged because it was client-attorney 
                                            
6  For a helpful summary of the germane facts see Fochville 2 paras 1-9. 
7  Hereinafter referred to as the attorney or the Centre's attorney. 
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correspondence, and that the material had been imparted under the 
promise of confidentiality. 
The Centre stated that the information had been collected so that the 
children could be provided with a means to express and place their views 
before the court. Importantly, the Centre also asserted that the school did 
not need the questionnaires in order to respond to its application to 
intervene. Furthermore, it was said that the children sought no relief from 
the allegations made, but merely wished to "participate in the litigation"8 by 
having their views ventilated. The attorney's summary, it was contended, 
was meant to give the court a holistic view of the children's views. The 
application came before Sutherland J in the then South Gauteng High Court, 
who ordered the Centre to produce the questionnaires and hand them over 
to the school. He also ordered the Centre to pay the applicant's costs.9 
Sutherland J's judgment canvassed all the grounds advanced by the Centre 
in refusing to disclose the material sought. The main ones were (a) privilege, 
(b) confidentiality, and (c) irrelevance; and in the event that the main 
grounds failed, (d) public interest immunity, together with the best interests 
of the child principle as set out in section 28(2) of the Constitution. The court 
first focused on whether any of the grounds advanced by the Centre could 
withstand an application in terms of rule 35(12). The rule states: 
Any party to any proceeding may at any time before the hearing thereof deliver 
a notice as near as may be in accordance with Form 15 in the First Schedule 
to any other party in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any 
document or tape recording to produce such document or tape recording for 
his inspection and to permit him to make a copy or transcription thereof. Any 
party failing to comply with such notice shall not, save with the leave of the 
court, use such document or tape recording in such proceeding provided that 
any other party may use such document or tape recording. 
In this context the court engaged in an assessment of the nature of the 
evidence. In discussing the nature of the attorney's evidence, the court 
made several important observations. It found that the attorney's evidence 
was "hearsay",10 that some of her evidence constituted her own personal 
opinion based on conclusions she claimed to have drawn from the 
information provided by the school, the most controversial of which 
pertained to allegations of racism emanating from the white children and 
staff at the school and directed at black children. Importantly, Sutherland J 
                                            
8  Fochville 2 para 7. 
9  Fochville 1 paras 85-87. 
10  Fochville 1 para 3.6. 
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also concluded that the attorney's evidence had been a "distilled"11 and 
"synthesised"12 version of the children's contentions. 
The court then engaged in a discussion of South African law on privilege 
and concluded that the questionnaires were indeed privileged but that such 
privilege had been impliedly waived. In so doing the court rejected the 
Centre's claim that it could not waive the privilege because the privilege had 
to be waived by the children themselves. The court found this approach 
misconceived because it had found that the real litigant in the case was the 
Centre and not the children.13 
Sutherland J also rejected the Centre's claims of irrelevance, and in the 
process of dealing with the important principle of onus, he stated: 
… the Centre's answering affidavit implies that the school ought to justify a 
need for the documents … that assumption would be incorrect. The onus to 
show irrelevance as a reason to refuse compliance rests on the Centre.14 
He accepted the school's argument that it needed the documents in order 
to ascertain the veracity of the allegations, and to consider putting up a 
rebuttal. 
Having failed on all the main grounds, the court considered the broader and 
more general arguments based on the Constitution, mainly the so-called 
"public interest considerations"15 and the "best interests of the child".16 The 
Centre argued that it was not in the children's best interest for the 
questionnaires to be discovered because of the risk of "harm to individual 
reputation and relationships".17 In essence, the Centre argued that the 
school would be able to identify the children from their handwriting and that 
this opened up the possibilities of retributive action against the children. In 
dealing with this question the court framed the issue by asking whether: 
It [is] proper that a litigant must deal with an adversary's case and be denied 
the supporting documentation on the grounds that a child composed them? 
The court went further to ask: 
Will the CLL be, generically, inhibited from protecting children's rights if it 
cannot keep confidential what children reveal to it in its investigations and 
                                            
11  Fochville 1 para 65. 
12  Fochville 1 paras 58, 65. 
13  Fochville 1 paras 50-53. 
14  Fochville 1 para 62. 
15  Fochville 1 paras 9, 67. 
16  Section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Constitution). Fochville 1 para 76. 
17  This contention was put forward in more detail in the Heads of Argument and during 
oral argument. 
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does it need to be specially licensed to present, to a court, hearsay evidence, 
cloaking its sources with anonymity, which the court is then expected to 
receive and treat as safe to rely upon? Can such conduct be sanctified under 
the rubric of 'the best interests of the child?'18 
The learned judge concluded that the answer was "no". He expressed the 
opinion that the principle of the best interests of the child should not be used 
as a casual mantra and that it did not mean that in every form of litigation in 
which children are involved, their interests must take precedence.19 The 
court found that the school would not be able to cogently rebut the 
allegations of racism if discovery was not granted.20 In sum, the court 
concluded that no justified public interest considerations warranted non-
disclosure.21 As already stated, this was in addition to its findings that 
confidentiality should not be used as an excuse to  resist disclosure under 
rule 35(12) and that whatever privilege might have existed had been 
waived.22 For these reasons, the court ordered disclosure. 
The main case was settled,23 but Sutherland J later granted leave to appeal 
against his judgment on a number of grounds.24 The court found that the 
matter was not moot, given that the issue might arise in future in the context 
of public interest bodies trying to adduce anonymous evidence in court in 
circumstances where children are involved.25 The court also accepted that 
another court might come to a different conclusion in relation to costs, given 
that the school was an organ of state, and that the issues involved had 
raised important constitutional questions. In this regard, the court accepted 
that it may have been wrong in granting a costs order against the Centre in 
that it failed to properly consider and apply the general principles relating to 
costs in constitutional litigation.26 
3 Round two: In the Supreme Court of Appeal 
The matter proceeded to the Supreme Court of Appeal. On the preliminary 
issue of mootness, the court accepted the appellant's argument as to why it 
should exercise its discretion to entertain the appeal in the light of the fact 
                                            
18  Fochville 1 para 75. 
19  Fochville 1 para 77. 
20  Fochville 1 para 82. 
21  Fochville 1 para 85. 
22  Fochville 1 para 61. 
23  The main case was the original dispute between the school and the Gauteng 
provincial government authorities. 
24  Centre for Child Law v Governing Body of Hoërskool Fochville; In Re: Governing 
Body of Hoërskool Fochville v Centre for Child Law 2014 4 All SA 196 (GJ) 
(hereinafter referred to as the "CLL appeal application"). 
25  CCL appeal application paras 12, 14. 
26  These principles are set out in Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources 2009 
6 SA 232 (CC). 
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that the main issue which gave rise to the case had been settled.27 Ponnan 
JA, writing for the full bench, began his judgment by pointing out that 
regardless of the merits or substance of the arguments advanced in terms 
of rule 35(12), the school's application could and possibly should have failed 
for failing to adhere to rule 30A of the Uniform Rules, which gives guidance 
as to what should occur in the event that a party who is called upon to 
comply with a certain request in terms of the rules fails to do so.28 He then 
proceeded to deal with a variety of issues. The first that I critique is what I 
will term the onus of proof in disclosure claims. 
3.1 Onus in disclosure claims 
At the heart of this case was the question posed earlier: should any party 
bear an onus of proving whether the disclosure of the information sought to 
be withheld is warranted? If so, which party? 
In answering this question one notes the stark contrast between the High 
Court's and the SCA's judgments. In considering the issue, the SCA began 
by considering Sutherland J's finding that the Centre bore an onus to prove 
why disclosure should not be ordered. In this regard, the SCA observed that 
Sutherland J appeared to have placed reliance on what was said in 
Gorfinkel v Gross, Hendler & Frank,29 where the court held that disclosure 
should be approached from the point of onus. The onus is that a party who 
refers to a document in litigation, but seeks to avoid sharing it with his 
adversary, must put forth acceptable reasons as to why disclosure should 
not be ordered. Ponnan JA rejected this approach, saying he had 
"reservations"30 as to whether it was an acceptable one. Instead, he held 
that a court has a: 
[G]eneral discretion in terms of which it is required to try to strike a balance 
between the conflicting interests of the parties to the case. Implicit in that is 
that it should not fetter its own discretion in any manner and particularly not 
by adopting a predisposition either in favour or against granting disclosure.31 
The nub of Ponnan JA's reasoning is that a court should not adopt a 
predisposition in favour of or against disclosure. This means that there is no 
need to place any form of onus or burden on any of the parties. In my view 
this approach is at the very least unfortunate and at worst incorrect. I believe 
that a court must in fact adopt an approach which recognises disclosure as 
a point of departure. In my view a court does not (or should not) have a 
                                            
27  Fochville 2 paras 10-14. 
28  Fochville 2 para 17. 
29  Gorfinkel v Gross Hendler & Frank 1987 3 SA 766 (C). 
30  Fochville 2 para 18. 
31  Fochville 2 para 18. 
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general discretion to decide whether or not disclosure of information 
mentioned or submitted in litigation should be disclosed to all the parties. 
The proper approach is to recognise that any material placed before court 
should be accessible to all parties unless exceptional circumstances exist. 
Implicit in this is that unless the party seeking to withhold the information 
can provide compelling reasons as to why disclosure should not occur, a 
court must order disclosure. 
In my view, in adopting the general discretion approach, the Supreme Court 
in essence went against the overriding theme and spirit of its judgment in 
City of Cape Town v South African National Roads Authority Limited.32 In 
that case the court engaged in a thorough analysis of international and 
foreign authorities, all of which highlight the importance of open justice. The 
court expressed the opinion, and rightly so, that "the default position is one 
of openness even in a case where the documents in question had been 
lawfully classified as confidential in the interest of national security".33 The 
court observed that the open court principle means that "court proceedings 
including the evidence and documents disclosed in proceedings should be 
open to public scrutiny".34 In highlighting the importance of openness being 
the default position, the court went on to add "it will be a dangerous thing 
for all litigants in both civil and criminal matters, for court documents, as a 
general rule to be inaccessible and unpublishable".35 The court also held 
that "the right to open justice must include the right to have access to papers 
and written arguments which are an integral part of court proceedings".36 
The court concluded by holding that: 
[T]he animating principle therefore has to be that all court records are, by 
default, public documents that are open to public scrutiny at all times. While 
there may be situations justifying a departure from that default position … any 
departure is an exception and must be justified.37 
Bearing the above in mind, it is quite difficult to understand why the court 
did not find that the Centre bore a heavy onus to show that disclosure should 
not occur.38 In my view, a more desirable approach in such matters is that 
                                            
32  City of Cape Town v South African National Roads Authority Limited 2015 3 SA 386 
(SCA) (hereinafter referred to as Sanral). 
33  Sanral para 16. 
34  Sanral para 12. 
35  Sanral para 18. 
36  Sanral para 19. 
37  Sanral para 48. 
38  This is particularly so when one considers a number of other cases in which the court 
argued that, in our constitutional democracy, the default position is one of openness, 
whether in court or in the legislature; Primedia Broadcasting (a Division of Primedia 
(Pty) Ltd) v Speaker of the National Assembly 2017 1 SA 572 (SCA); Multichoice 
(Proprietary) Limited v National Prosecuting Authority, In Re; S v Pistorius, In Re; 
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generally a party seeking to withhold disclosure should bear the task of 
showing why this is justified. Implicit in this is that the court should adopt a 
view that favours disclosure. I will elaborate on this point later when I deal 
with foreign law within the context of developing a set of factors that courts 
should take into account when considering cases where a party seeks to 
withhold information in litigation, on the basis that disclosure will 
compromise the safety of a child who might be the subject of the litigation. 
3.2 Best interests of the child: A determinative defence? 
The second issue that I will address is whether there were any factors 
present in this case which justified non-disclosure. Even though the 
Supreme Court failed to place a specific and direct duty on the Centre to 
prove that non-disclosure was warranted, the Centre, to the extent that it 
was relevant, argued that disclosure was not in the children's best interests. 
In so doing it invoked the best interests of the child principle39 and argued 
that this principle should sustain their arguments that non-disclosure was 
justified in the circumstances. Notably, in both the High Court and in the 
Supreme Court, the Centre seemed to place significant emphasis on the 
best interests of the child principle.40 This emphasis seemed to suggest that 
the Centre's view was that regardless of the circumstances, the children's 
interest must prevail. I will briefly deal with this point, having regard to the 
fact that the High Court emphatically rejected this point, while the SCA 
appears to have been more open to accepting it. 
Generally, a court should strive to protect the interests of children as widely 
as possible, as they constitute a vulnerable class in society. Indeed, section 
28(2) of the Constitution states: "A child's best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child." However, the best 
interests of the child principle must be understood within the context of the 
fact that its ambit is not unlimited, a point emphasised in S v M.41 Moreover, 
there is no hierarchy of rights in our Constitution,42 and so the best interests' 
principle does not mean that children are accorded greater or super rights 
by the Constitution. Put differently, while the principle must be given a 
generous and purposive interpretation, one must bear in mind, as the High 
Court did,43 that: 
                                            
Media 24 Limited v Director of Public Prosecutions North Gauteng 2014 1 SACR 589 
(GP). 
39  Section 28 of the Constitution and in particular, s 28(2) states "A child's best interests 
are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child". 
40  Fochville 1 para 70; Fochville 2 paras 24-26. 
41  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae).2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 26. 
42  The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 4 SA 191 (CC) para 148. 
43  Fochville 1 paras 76-77. 
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The best interests of the child does not apply absolutely and will not trump any 
other competing right or interest every time … The best interests of the child 
does not necessarily mean that the affected right of the child should prevail 
every time.44 
In short, in determining whether disclosure should be ordered in such cases, 
it is no determinative answer to state that disclosure or non-disclosure is in 
the best interests of the child. A child's best interest is a relevant 
consideration, but it is one of many factors that must be considered. This 
means a party cannot without more invoke the best interest of the child 
principle in order to rebut the case of his or her adversary. It follows, that 
since the best interest of the child is not dispositive of such issues, we must 
venture to consider other factors which will help guide the courts in deciding 
cases that have competing interests similar to the ones in the Fochville 
cases. 
It bears emphasising that I do not mean to say that the best interest of the 
child is an irrelevant or inconsequential consideration in such cases. Indeed, 
Ponnan JA observed that there may well be other public interest 
considerations which require non-disclosure, even in circumstances where 
the material concerned is privileged and waiver exists.45 This includes the 
fact that in some instances disclosure might not be in a child's best interest. 
I accept this; but this begs the question: what other factors do we take into 
account when deciding whether such public interest considerations exist or 
are compelling enough to help a court decide a matter? If a child's best 
interest principle is not determinative of a claim, what other considerations 
need to be taken into account? Sadly, the court did not speak to this 
question in a sufficiently clear and concise manner. 
Put differently, my concern here is that the SCA's musing does not provide 
clear guidance as to the factors that lower courts need to take into account 
when dealing with the competing interests of the need for openness in 
litigation, on the one hand, and the interests of children, on the other. 
4 Working towards developing a clearer approach 
In arguing that a clear test or approach should be formulated, I will refer to 
the jurisprudence of courts in the United Kingdom (UK). I refer to this foreign 
jurisdiction bearing in mind that section 39(2) of the Constitution states that 
"when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum …may 
consider foreign law". Our courts have on many occasions affirmed the 
importance and usefulness of foreign and comparative law in the context of 
                                            
44  Malherbe "Impact of Constitutional Rights on Education" 440. 
45  Fochville 2 para 26. 
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adjudication, more recently in H v Fetal Assessment Centre,46 where 
Froneman J provides a useful summary regarding the application of foreign 
law in South African courts. I am also acutely aware of the dangers of merely 
translocating foreign precedent and applying it acontexually, and the fact 
that reliance on comparative law must be done with circumspection and only 
when it is contextually appropriate.47 
Courts in the UK frequently face situations where a party to private 
litigation,48 refuses to disclose certain documents or information to his or her 
adversary on the basis that if the concerned information is disclosed, there 
will be a risk of harm to a child.49 In most instances, the party seeking to 
prevent disclosure argues that his adversary may take retributive action 
against the child.50 On the other hand, the party seeking the information, 
often argues that such information is necessary in order for him or her to 
respond to allegations made against him and thereby vindicate his or her 
rights. Those seeking to withhold the documents often invoke the principle 
of "public interest immunity or privilege".51 This defence allows a party 
withhold the information if the court is of the view that the public interests 
demands so. 
4.1 Public interest immunity 
Through a number of important decisions the UK courts have developed 
jurisprudence that may help us. Arguably the most important of these cases 
is that of D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.52 
That case accorded to people who informed the authorities of allegations of 
child abuse the same protection as police informants. In so doing, the court 
dealt with one important issue, which was raised in Fochville. This is 
whether the fact that information is imparted confidentially is enough to 
                                            
46  H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 2 SA 193 (CC) para 28. 
47  Bernstein v Bester 1996 2 SA 751 (CC) para 133. 
48  In South Africa, a guarantee of confidentiality of secret sources has often been given 
in the context of police informers or public interest privilege, also known as state 
privilege (Van der Linde v Calitz 1967 2 SA 239 (A)). It has also been extended to 
police informers. Els v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 2 SACR 93 (NC). The 
reason for this form of privilege is to ensure that the public can provide state officials 
with useful information without fear of reprisals. There are a few South African 
precedents dealing with immunity of this nature in the context of pure civil litigation. 
However, the courts have shown a willingness to consider the extension of such 
immunities even in private litigation. See Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 
1994 4 SA 218 (W) 235H; Bridon International GMBH International Trade 
Administration Commission 2013 3 SA 197 (SCA) paras 19-22. 
49  See for example A (A Child), Re: SC [2012] UKSC 60 (hereinafter referred to as A 
Child) and the cases cited therein. 
50  A Child and the cases cited therein. 
51  See for example Re J (A Child: Disclosure) [2012] EWCA Civ 1204. 
52  D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children HL [1977] 1 All ER 589 
(hereinafter referred to as D v NSPCC). 
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ensure non-disclosure. In dealing with this point, the House of Lords 
stressed that it was not that the information is communicated confidentially 
which triggers immunity, but the public interest in encouraging society to 
come forward with information that may help authorities to protect the 
interests of children. As Lord Hailsham put it: 
Any attempt to withhold relevant evidence therefore must be justified and 
requires to be jealously scrutinised. The appellants noted that the dissenting 
judgment of Lord Denning MR which was in their favour, largely relied on the 
confidentiality which the appellants had pledged to potential informants. Their 
own contention was that, while the mere fact that a communication was made 
in confidence did not of itself justify nondisclosure, the fact of confidentiality 
was relevant to reinforce the view that disclosure would be against the public 
interest …. I am compelled to say that, in the breadth and generality with which 
they were put forward, I do not find them acceptable …. They seem to me to 
give far too little weight to the general importance of the principle that, in all 
cases before them, the courts should insist on parties and witnesses 
disclosing the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, where this would 
assist the decision of the matters in dispute.53 
Lord Hailsham's comments clearly mean that generally it is undesirable for 
a court to allow a party to withhold disclosure in the context of litigation, 
merely because he or she asserts that the information was received 
confidentially.54 This, as I will demonstrate, is contrary to what the SCA held 
in Fochville, where a high premium was placed on the fact that the Centre's 
attorney had promised the children that their information and identities 
would be kept confidential.55 
Over the years, and building on D v NSPCC, courts in the UK have 
developed much clearer standards and tests to deal with claims in which it 
is alleged that the discovery of certain information may lead to some harm 
to children involved. As I will show, what is clear is that even where this 
assertion is made, the courts will not lightly refuse disclosure. 
Dealing with these tests brings me back to one of the main issues in the 
Fochville cases, which is; who bears the onus of proving whether non-
disclosure is justified? Is there a need for a court to adopt a predisposition 
                                            
53  D v NSPCC 600. 
54  See also the comments of Lord Diplock in D v NSPCC 594, where he said: "The fact 
that information has been communicated in confidence is not in itself a ground for 
protecting from disclosure in a court of law the nature of the information or the identity 
of the informant. …The private promise of confidentiality must yield to the general 
public interest that in the administration of justice the truth will out unless ... a more 
important public interest is served by protecting the information." 
55  Generally speaking, an undertaking to keep material confidential will not sustain a 
refusal to disclose in court proceedings. Our law has always accepted that 
confidentiality alone is not a ground for objecting to disclosure. See Comair v the 
Minister of Public Enterprises 2014 5 SA 608 (GP) para 43. 
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in favour of disclosure? As previously professed, in my view the answer is 
"yes". My views find support in the case of Re A (A Child),56 where the UK 
Supreme Court highlighted the importance of a predisposition towards 
disclosure needing to be balanced with the interests of the child when it 
said: 
The presumption in favour of disclosure is strong indeed, but not so strong 
that it can be withheld only if the judge is satisfied that real harm to the child 
must otherwise ensue.57 
The approach of the Supreme Court is supported by comments in Re B, R 
and C (Children),58 where it was said: 
It is for those who seek to restrain the disclosure of papers to a litigant to make 
good their claim and to demonstrate with precision exactly which documents 
or classes of documents require to be withheld. The burden is a heavy one.59 
These statements illustrate that when a court engages in an act of balancing 
competing interests regarding the appropriateness of disclosure, it must 
adopt an approach which favours disclosure. The converse is that a heavy 
burden is placed on the party seeking to withhold disclosure to show why 
this is justified. It is for this reason that I disagree with Ponnan JA's view that 
a court should not take a predisposition in favour of disclosure as the point 
of departure.60 
Put differently, my difficulty with the Centre's case is that it sought to place 
a reverse onus on the school, through requiring the school to show that it 
needed the documents sought, a concern shared by Sutherland J in the 
High Court.61 Unfortunately, the SCA validated the Centre's approach by 
arguing that the school had not shown that it needed the questionnaires.62 
In my view, what ought to have transpired is that the court should have 
required the Centre not only to show that disclosure was merely 
undesirable, but to demonstrate through cogent evidence that grave harm 
would indeed occur if disclosure was ordered. 
As Maurice KJ recently put it in Dunn v Durham County Council: 
                                            
56  A Child para 19. 
57  A Child para 19. 
58  Re B, R and C (Children) [2002] EWCA Civ 1825 (hereinafter referred to as C 
Children). 
59  C Children para 29. 
60  Fochville 2 para 18. 
61  Fochville 1 para 62. 
62  Fochville 2 para 28. 
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It is for the party or person in possession of the document or who would be 
adversely affected by its disclosure or inspection to assert exemption from 
disclosure or inspection.63 
These views have been embraced by South African commentators, Pillay 
and Zaal who, although writing in the context of discovery through the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005, say: 
We recommend that full discovery of all significant evidential items to 
opposing adult parties and legal representatives become the norm in 
children's court litigation. This has for many years been the position in 
children's cases in England and Canada, for example. In these systems 
disclosure is the general rule and not the exception … The same approach is 
surely essential in South Africa.64 
Furthermore, in Re D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality)65 Lord 
Mustill elaborately set out a list of factors which constitute a test for a public 
interest immunity claim to succeed in a case where it is alleged that 
disclosure would put some interest of a child at risk. The court held that 
when conducting the balancing act, a court should consider: (a) whether the 
disclosure of the material would involve a real possibility of significant harm 
to the child; (b) consider whether the overall interests of the child would 
benefit from non-disclosure, weighing on the one hand the interest of the 
child in having the material properly tested, and on the other both the 
magnitude of the risk that harm will occur and the gravity of the harm if it 
does occur; (c) the court should also consider the interest of the other party 
in having an opportunity to see and respond to the material. The court 
should take into account the importance of the material to the issues in the 
case. 
Lord Mustill's factors illustrate that the best interest of a child is but one 
consideration that a court must take into account. Importantly, his test 
recognises that a court must also consider as equally important the need for 
non-disclosure to be an exception to the principle of openness. It is hoped 
that in time, South African courts (or the legislature) will adopt a similar 
approach. 
Another important theme in the UK authorities is that any claims that harm 
might ensue must be demonstrable and that harm must be reasonably likely 
to occur if disclosure is not withheld. Clearly, this places an onus on the 
party seeking to withhold disclosure to prove that such harm may ensue. 
                                            
63  Dunn v Durham County Council [2013] 1 WLR 2305 para 23. 
64  Pillay and Zaal 2011 SALJ 639. 
65  Re D (Minors) (Adoption Reports: Confidentiality) [1995] 2 FLR 687 (hereinafter 
referred to as Re D (Minors)). 
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It bears mentioning that the SCA has itself dealt with a case where it was 
alleged that certain conduct might place children's safety and well-being at 
significant risk. Although the facts were different, in KG v CB66 the court held 
that the onus is on the party who seeks to restrain such conduct and in the 
course avert the purported harm to prove the significance and 
reasonableness of the alleged fears. Van Heerden JA, citing with approval 
English precedent, observed: 
There is therefore an established line of authority that the court should require 
clear and compelling evidence of the grave risk of harm or other intolerability 
which must be measured as substantial, not trivial.67 
In Fochville 2, Ponnan JA clearly took a less stringent assessment of the 
Centre's claim that there was a fear, held at least by the children, that harm 
or prejudice might ensue if the children's identities were disclosed.68 He 
reasoned that there was nothing to suggest that such perceptions were not 
held in good faith or rather genuinely held.69 In essence, he appears to have 
taken the appellants at their word. This approach is at odds with the more 
stringent approach advocated in the United Kingdom. It is simply too lenient 
an approach. 
I do not doubt that the fears of the potential harm were held in good faith, 
but the mere fact that a party holds a belief in good faith is not reason 
enough to dispel a claim that material relied upon in litigation be disclosed 
to an adversary. This is even more so where the adversary alleges that he 
or she needs the information in order to ventilate his case. Whatever belief 
is held, it must be vigorously scrutinised by the court, a process which 
includes requiring the party that seeks to withhold disclosure to back up his 
or her assertions through cogent evidence.70 In Re D (Minors) the court put 
it as follows: 
                                            
66  KG v CB 2012 4 SA 136 (SCA) (hereinafter referred to as KG). 
67  KG para 49. 
68  Fochville 2 para 27. 
69  Fochville 2 para 27. 
70  In Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a e-tv v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 
2007 5 SA 540 (SCA) (hereinafter referred to as Midi Television), the SCA dealt with 
an issue involving the claim that the publication of some information might cause 
prejudice to a party. Nugent JA held at paras 16 and 19 that there must be a 
"demonstrable and substantial … real risk that prejudice will occur. … Mere 
conjecture and speculation that prejudice might occur will not be enough". Although 
the factual circumstances in Midi Television were different from those in the Fochville 
cases, Nugent JA's comments illustrate that claims of potential harm or prejudice 
ensuing should disclosure occur will not be entertained lightly. 
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The court should be rigorous in its examination of the risk and gravity of the 
feared harm to the child, and should order non-disclosure only when the case 
for doing so is compelling.71 
Anything short of this exacting standard may lead to an abuse of claims of 
confidentiality, or fears of the risk of harm or prejudice. After all, there is an 
important principle behind the need to limit the use of anonymous evidence 
in litigation. It is that a party must face his accuser and should be able to 
challenge his or her evidence. 
5 The Implications of the SCA judgment 
The SCA's judgment suggests that where a public interest organisation 
such as the Centre engages in litigation it may withhold relevant 
documentation from its adversary if it can show that it or the children 
honestly believe they will suffer harm if the material is disclosed. More 
disturbingly, the court suggests that once it is shown that the perception of 
potential harm is genuinely held, disclosure is likely not to be ordered.72 
Such a low and vague standard leaves the claim to public interest immunity 
open to abuse. 
The courts in the UK have learnt from experience. Over the years, and far 
too often, public interest bodies representing children would arrive in court 
and refuse to disclose relevant documents on the alleged basis that 
disclosure might lead to harm to the children concerned.73 The courts 
quickly realised that the claim of public interest immunity was being abused, 
to the detriment of opposing litigants. It for this reason that Lord Bingham 
once warned that "public interest immunity is not a trump card vouchsafed 
to certain privileged players to play when and as they wish".74 
In the light of realising that social or public interest bodies were in effect 
abusing immunity claims, courts in the UK have begun to take a more 
stringent approach in dealing with such cases. As Munby LJ recently 
observed: 
… general statements that one sees in textbooks and hears that social work 
records are covered by public interest immunity which is a widely stated class 
claim, should now be consigned to history.75 
                                            
71  Re D (Minors) 615. 
72  Fochville 2 para 27. 
73  See comments of Butler-Sloth LJ in Re M (A Minor) (1989) 88 LGR 841 849-850. 
74  Makanjuola v Commissioner of Police of Metropolis [1992] 3 All ER 617 623. 
Emphasis added. 
75  Dunn v Durham County Council [2013] 1 WLR 2305 para 44, citing Charles J in Re 
(Care: Disclosure: Nature of Proceedings) [2002] 1 FLR 755 777. 
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This remark was made in the context of emphasising that courts must not 
lightly allow public interest bodies representing children to refuse to disclose 
material to their adversaries in litigation. It would be unfortunate if our courts 
fell into the trap of giving such bodies free passes, based on the supposed 
progressive work they do. 
The Centre is a social public interest organisation that plays a positive role 
in advancing the constitutional rights of children, and it has received judicial 
recognition for its work. However, it bears repeating that preferential 
treatment should not be extended to public interest organisations merely 
because of the progressive nature of the work they do.76 As I have already 
observed, this is a point that was well captured and appreciated by 
Sutherland J in the High Court.77 Such bodies should not expect to be able 
to withhold information from their adversaries in litigation, merely because 
they assert that so doing is in the best interests of a child. This is because 
presenting anonymous evidence is antithetical to the principle of open 
justice. As such, any litigant who wishes to withhold any relevant information 
from his adversary must provide the court with compelling reasons. This is 
even more so in circumstances where the information sought to be withheld 
has been relied upon as a basis for the institution of the legal proceedings, 
as was the case in the Fochville matter. 
6 Conclusion 
This note has discussed the extent to which courts should allow parties in 
litigation to withhold information from their adversaries on the basis that 
such information is not in the best interests of a child, particularly in 
circumstances where the information has been relied on as a basis for 
making allegations against one's adversary. In this regard, I have argued 
that in Fochville 2 the Supreme Court of Appeal missed an opportunity to 
develop a clear and concise test to be applied by courts when considering 
competing interests such as those that arose in the Fochville cases. I have 
also criticised the SCA's suggestion that the promise of confidentiality can 
be a self-standing ground for a party to resist a discovery application. I have 
argued that this suggestion is inconsistent with both our precedents and 
relevant useful foreign law. In this regard I have argued that our courts can 
obtain guidance from the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom, where the 
courts have faced questions similar or analogous to those in the Fochville 
cases. I have attempted to demonstrate that it is not sufficient for a party 
wishing to withhold information merely to assert that disclosure will not be 
in the public interest or the child's interest. This is even more so where a 
party merely asserts that there is a fear that if disclosure is made, some 
                                            
76  Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources 2009 6 SA 232 (CC) paras 16-18. 
77  Fochville 1 para 73. 
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unspecified harm to the children might occur. Rather, such a party must 
demonstrate through cogent evidence that such harm is indeed likely to 
occur if disclosure is made. Proving this, I have argued, is no easy burden. 
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